Using unique data on employee ownership plans sponsored by U.S. public companies, we estimate the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on individual investors' participation and trading decisions. Consistent with a decreased willingness to take risk, we observe an increase in the average propensity to exercise employee stock options following the crisis, controlling for grant timing and moneyness in addition to time-invariant firm and employee characteristics. However, the results are concentrated among employees with limited experience in option plans prior to the pre-crisis run-up in equity prices. Moreover, we find that low-experience employees also increase their participation in employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) following the shock. Conditional on initiating participation in ESPPs, we find that they are disproportionally likely to sell the acquired shares both immediately and within the first year of ownership. Since declining to participate in an ESPP amounts to leaving money on the table, our results suggest a new wrinkle in our understanding of how investors' personal return experiences interact with risk preferences. While negative shocks appear to diminish investors' appetites for risk, they also mitigate investor inattention. Thus, at least along certain dimensions, they can induce investors to make decisions that are closer to the optimum. * Preliminary and incomplete. Do not circulate without the authors' permission.
Introduction
How do major shocks like the 2008 financial crisis affect investor trading decisions? One potential channel is through investor preferences. For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) report increases in two survey-based measures of individual risk aversion among Italian investors following the crisis. Another possible channel is through investor beliefs. If the crisis reveals information about the probabilities of future states, then rational investors should update their beliefs and strategies accordingly. Moreover, recent work suggests that there could be cross-sectional variation in investors' responses to a common shock because individuals tend to overweight their own past return experience at the expense of other publicly available information (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003; Kaustia and Knupfer, 2008; Choi et al, 2009; Chiang et al, 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) .
Using investor participation and trading data within employer-sponsored ownership plans, we find evidence of a third, less often cited channel: investor attention. Many studies find evidence of inertia in individual investment decisions including, for example, disproportionate allocations of savings to default options in retirement plans (O'Donaghue and Rabin, 1999; Madrian and Shea, 2001) . A major shock to prices in asset markets is likely to shock investors' attention to their portfolio allocations.
1 Increased attention, in turn, could lead investors to revise their portfolios away from passive default options and toward the allocations that maximize their welfare given their preferences and beliefs. Consistent with this prediction, we find evidence that investors increase the frequency and intensity with which they exercise option grants following the crisis, but also simultaneously increase participation in employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs). Moreover, the effects are concentrated among investors with the least investment experience leading up to the crisis. Though the welfare implications of accelerated option exercise are unclear, failure to participate in an ESPP is equivalent to leaving money on the table because the plans typically allow employees to purchase shares at discounts to market prices and, in most cases, to immediately sell the acquired shares. Thus, major financial market shocks may have an unexpected benefit: they disrupt patterns of inertia that lead to non-action and nudge passive investors towards active strategies that maximize value.
We use a unique panel dataset of investor accounts within the employer-sponsored ownership plans of large U.S. corporations to measure the effect of the 2008 crisis on investors'
trading choices. We focus on participation and trading behavior in employee stock plans for two key reasons. First, holdings within these plans typically comprise a large fraction of an employee's overall wealth. For example, an individual stock option grant is worth on average roughly 14% of net worth at the time of exercise in our sample. These positions are often undiversified, particularly given that employees' human capital is also invested in the firm. Thus, decisions in these plans have a major impact on participants' overall financial wellbeing. Second, unlike other types of investment vehicles -such as brokerage or day-trading accounts -stock option grants are awarded by the firm to employees. Thus, we can measure differences in investors' trading behavior absent from potential biases due to self-selection into participation.
Our first step is to measure changes in employees' propensities to exercise company stock options. We consider all option grants employees receive in symmetric 3-year windows before and after the 2008 financial crisis, 2005-2007 and 2010-2012 , and restrict the sample to employees who receive at least one grant in each period. For each grant, we define a variable that indicates whether the employee exercised any options in the package during the three-year window and a second variable that measures the percentage of the package that the employee exercised. Consistent with the evidence in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) , we observe that both the likelihood and the intensity of option exercise increases following the crisis. This aggregate pattern is consistent with rational investor updating in response to changes in fundamentals if, for example, employees are risk averse and under-diversified and the crisis increases expected stock return volatility. However, it could also be a consequence of investor overreaction to the losses they experienced during the crisis or of optimal rebalancing by previously passive investors shocked into a state of heightened attention by the crisis.
To begin to disentangle the mechanisms, we construct a difference-in-differences estimator that compares at the grant level the change in option exercise timing among employees with prior experience with option grants within the firm's compensation plan to employees with limited or no experience with option grants. In all specifications we include event-month fixed effects to control for differences in the timing of option grants within the pre-and post-crisis windows across employees, employee fixed effects to control for time-invariant employee characteristics including the identity of the employing firm (and, by implication, the underlying stock in their option grants), and (non-linear) controls for the size of the grant and for the appreciation in the price of the underlying stock from the grant date to the end of the pre-or post-crisis window. We find that the tendency to exercise options earlier post-crisis is concentrated among investors with little experience with company options at the outset of the sample period. In most specifications, experienced investors do not make significant adjustments to their option exercise behavior. Moreover, the effect of experience is robust to controlling for relations between changes in option exercise behavior and employee wealth, income, and age.
We also find that the differential effect of the crisis on the option exercises of inexperienced investors has a strong positive relation with the magnitude of the decline in the employing firm's stock price from the pre-crisis market peak to the post-crisis market trough, confirming that the shock itself is likely to drive the changes in exercise behavior. As a robustness check, we evaluate the timing of exercise by calculating the percentage of the Black-Scholes value on the exercise date that investors forfeit by exercising early, finding similar results. We also adjust for changes in firms' option compensation plans by including a firm fixed effect interacted with an indicator for sample-years in the post-crisis window, again with little effect on our results.
In isolation, the option exercise results are consistent with a model in which investors overweight their personal return experiences when they update their beliefs or an alternative model in which the crisis shocks passive investors to make active portfolio decisions. We next turn our attention to employee behavior in ESPPs, which allows us to establish the importance of the attention mechanism. We again consider the set of employees who received at least one option grant in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis window. We define a variable that indicates in each window whether the employee chooses to participate in her firm's ESPP. We then estimate a difference-in-differences specification that mirrors our specification in the options context.
Here we do not include any event-time effects since there is no variation in the timing of eligibility to participate in the plans across employees. However, we control for stock returns over various horizons. We use the same indicator for treatment as in the option context: little or no experience with option grants at the beginning of the pre-crisis window. Thus, we measure differences in the changes in ESPP participation choices across exactly the same groups for which we measured differences in changes in option exercise decisions. We find that the same low experience investors who accelerate option exercise also significantly increase their rates of participation in ESPPs relative to investors with more experience. Here, we also find a significant effect of employee age on changes in ESPP participation; however, the effect appears to be distinct from the effect of limited investor experience. And, again, the effect of limited experience is larger among employees in firms with a larger decline in stock prices between the market peak and market trough dates. Finally, we measure differences in holding periods conditional on participating in an ESPP. We find that inexperienced investors increase their relative likelihood of quickly divesting the shares they acquire in the ESPP following the crisis.
2
While the value tradeoff between holding the shares and quickly divesting them is unclear and depends on investor preferences and beliefs, the decision to participate in the ESPP and quickly sell the acquired shares unambiguously dominates non-participation given that the shares are typically offered for purchase at steep discounts to current market value.
3
Overall, our analysis identifies an attention component to the adjustments investors make in response to financial market shocks like the crisis of 2008. The bulk of the adjustments occur among investors with limited prior investment experience. Though models in which investors overweight personal return experiences when forming beliefs can explain some of the evidenceinexperienced investors do accelerate option exercise after the negative shock -they have difficulty reconciling the whole range of results. In particular, these same investors also increase their participation in ESPPs. Given that this choice unambiguously increases wealth, the evidence suggests a welfare gain from the increased attention investors pay to their portfolio allocations following the crisis.
Our results contribute to the growing literature that analyzes the effect of individual experiences on beliefs and behavior. Prior work finds evidence broadly consistent with theories 2 Note also that the decision to shorten holding periods post-crisis is consistent with the decision to exercise options earlier. 3 It is technically possible that a firm can offer an ESPP plan either without a discount to market prices or without a lookback window allowing the participant to purchase the stock at the lowest price during a historical period. However, these plans are designed to encourage employee participation and, as such, are designed with benefits to participation.
of reinforcement learning (Cross, 1973; Arthur, 1991 Arthur, , 1993 Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998) : market returns experienced by individual investors predict participation rates in equity markets (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) . Similarly, investors' personal return histories in IPO investments predict future participation in IPOs (Kaustia and Knupfer, 2008; Chiang et al, 2009 ) and personal histories of positive returns predict higher future savings rates in 401(k) plans (Choi et al, 2009) . Many of these studies use survey responses to measure investment choices or analyze specific types of investments, like IPOs, that may not be common for the typical investor. We instead measure direct investor choices within the previously unstudied universe of employer sponsored ownership plans. The investment universe includes equities of large, public U.S. companies across a broad cross-section of employees. 4 We also identify cross-sectional differences in choices depending on investor experience levels. Our evidence complements the analysis of Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) who finds heterogeneity in investor beliefs depending on experience levels and Greenwood and Nagel (2009) who find larger tilts toward technology stocks in the portfolios of younger mutual fund managers prior to the peak of the tech bubble in the late 1990s (and, consequently, larger ex post decreases in tech stock holdings).
Our results also complement a growing literature that examines how prior experiences affect the beliefs and policy choices of corporate executives. While much of the individual investor literature focuses on general correlations between returns and investment choices, many of the papers in the managerial literature use an identification strategy more similar to ours, measuring responses to shocks to executive beliefs. For example, Graham and Narasimhan (2004) find that CEOs who directly experienced the Great Depression subsequently chose more conservative capital structures. Dessaint and Matray (2015) find that managers whose firms are located near the disaster area from a hurricane strike hoard cash over the following year. A number of studies find evidence that effects of major negative shocks on executive beliefs can be long-lasting (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Schoar and Zuo, 2011; Dittmar and Duchin, forthcoming; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, forthcoming) . We find that similar effects exist among individual investors, at least in the window immediately surrounding a negative shock.
We also contribute to the literature on investor attention. One approach to identifying variation in investor attention across securities in recent literature is to exploit data from Google searches and other social media (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) . We instead exploit variation around an attention grabbing event: the 2008 financial crisis. We also exploit variation across firms in the intensity of the decline in stock prices from the market peak to trough. On this dimension, our approach is similar to Barber and Odean (2008) who use extreme return days as
attention-grabbing events to analyze the cross-section of stocks.
Finally, we add to the discussion of the household-level effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Existing work focuses mainly on the effects of house prices on household balance sheets.
For example, Sufi (2011) and Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) measure the effects of house prices on household borrowing and the consumption effects of the "debt overhang" created by high household debt levels post-crisis. We complement their analysis of household liabilities by exploring the effects of the crisis on the mix of households' assets.
Data
To measure household portfolio rebalancing in the wake of the financial crisis, we use aggregated, non-identifiable data provided by an equity compensation administration services provider, hereafter referred to as "Company X". The data include information on grants of employee stock options and restricted shares as well as participation in employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs). The data also contain information on transactions related to these holdings. We observe information for over 500 publicly-traded firms between 2004 and 2013. We also observe ticker symbols for the firms included in the data allowing us to align employee equity ownership information with company accounting information from Compustat and stock price information from CRSP.
We measure changes in employees' willingness to bear firm-specific risk using changes in their option exercise patterns around the crisis. To calculate these changes, we identify a 36 month pre-crisis period, [2005] [2006] [2007] , and a symmetric 36 month post-crisis period, 2010-2012.
We exclude from our analysis the years 2008 and 2009, during which the decline in stock market prices associated with the financial crisis occurred. We also limit the sample to employees who received at least one stock option grant in both the pre-and post-crisis periods. After these restrictions, our sample contains 57,291 distinct employees.
We calculate three measures of option exercise activity. First, we measure the percentage of all options granted during a given three-year window that the employee exercises. Second, we construct a binary indicator variable that takes the value one if the employee exercises any grants during the given three-year window. These two variables allow us to compute changes in option exercise on both the extensive and intensive margins. Third, we measure the value-weighted average of the Black-Scholes value that the employee forfeits by exercising options before the expiration date. We construct all three measures using only options granted and exercised in that three-year window. An unavoidable limitation given the time series of grants and transactions in our data is that in almost all cases we cannot observe investor exercise decisions within a particular option grant all the way to expiration. Most option grants have a life of ten years before expiration and we only observe ten years of transaction data. It is possible, for example, that a pattern of earlier exercise in the first three years following an option grant among a subset of employees could reverse over the remaining seven years before expiration. Though we cannot directly tests for such reversals, we can assess whether investors' decisions on option grants are consistent with their decisions on other types of grants that are not as long-lived.
We construct several variables to measure how employees behave within their firms'
ESPPs. To allow us to assess the consistency of behavior across investment vehicles, we focus on a subset of the same employees over the same three-year windows for which we measure stock option grants and exercises. 5 Unlike stock option plans, participation in ESPPs is at the employee's discretion. In a qualified ESPP plan, all full time employees are eligible to participate, meaning they have the right to purchase the firm's stock at a specified discount of up to 15% from the market price. 6 An employee who elects to participate must actively choose a portion of their compensation to be withheld in the plan during each pay period for the purchase of stock under the plan (the typical allowable range of contribution, conditional on participating, is 1% to 15% of compensation). In some cases, participants receive favorable tax treatment on long term capital gains (only) if they hold the stock for certain minimum holding periods.
However, once stock is purchased, the employee can sell it at any time. Thus, we consider variation both in employees' decisions to participate and in their holding periods conditional on participation.
5 The ESPP sample starts with all employees in the option sample. We then exclude employees working at firms that did not offer an ESPP in both windows of observation. 6 In a plan that is qualified under U.S. tax law, the employee does not owe any taxes on the discount at the time of purchase. Non-qualified plans are otherwise the same as qualified plans, but do not have this favored tax treatment. The discount is typically calculated by taking the minimum stock price over a lookback window of a pre-specified length.
We define for each of the two three-year windows a binary indicator that equals one for employees who participate in the firm's ESPP. We also construct two series of indicator 
Empirical Strategy
Our hypothesis is that major shocks to the market, like the financial crisis of 2008, also shock passive individual investors into heightened attention to their portfolio decisions. Once nudged to action, investors could make choices that reflect either heightened risk aversion or updated beliefs that overweight the recent negative experience. In this case, the value implications for the investor are unclear. However, they may also correct value-destroying passive investment strategies -like failing to participate in ESPPs.
To test our hypothesis, we measure differences in investors' choices within employer sponsored ownership plans in an eight year window around the financial crisis. For our purposes, the crisis provides a good source of identifying variation because the shock to market prices is exogenous from the point of view of individual investors determining their portfolio allocations. . A potential concern with measuring changes around even an exogenous event is that there are other contemporaneous events that might also affect the outcomes of interest and therefore preclude causal inferences. While it is unlikely that there is another macro event that could dominate the effect of the crisis on choices during our window of interest, particularly given the broad scope of our data, we do not draw our main inferences from the change in aggregate behavior around the crisis. Instead, we focus on the difference in differences between employees with high and low levels of investment experience.
Our strategy relies on an assumption that the crisis has a larger effect among investors with little or no prior experience in their firms' ownership plans. Prior research finds that large subsets of employees passively opt into default options within retirement plans, particularly when newly eligible to participate (e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001) . It is reasonable to predict that employees may be similarly passive when they first receive employer-sponsored equity compensation plans. As employees' time in their plan increases, however, various events could occur that cause them to start actively monitoring and adjusting their portfolios. The simplest is reaching the expiration date of initial option grants. Alternatively, various other mechanisms could shock their attention: word-of-mouth, education, the experience of returns from their passive strategy, the realization of forgone returns from not making active selections, etc. Thus, as experience increases, the mass of passive investors in the sample is likely to decrease. If so, then the crisis can provide a larger shock to the attention of the subset of investors with limited
experience. An alternative mechanism that can reinforce the cross-sectional difference between low and high experience employees is the tendency of investors to update their market beliefs using their own histories' of experienced returns rather than the full set of publicly available information (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) . If investors behave this way, inexperienced investors will make larger adjustments than experienced investors because the crisis will receive a larger weight when they update their beliefs, even if they are not passive prior to the shock.
To estimate the difference in differences in employees' option exercise decisions between the pre-and post-crisis windows, we implement the following regression specification:
where g indexes a specific option grant within the compensation plan, i indexes the employee, and t indexes the month. The dependent variable is typically either an indicator variable that equals one if the employee ever exercised any portion of the option grant within the three-year window in which it was granted or the percentage of the options s/he exercised within the window. After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for grants that the employee receives in the post-crisis window. Low Exper is a measure of employee experience. In most specifications, we define Low Exper as an indicator variable equal to 1 for employees with no prior option grants at the beginning of the pre-crisis window; however, we also consider robustness checks in which we include (1) a continuous measure of experience or (2) a measure that also captures experience with ESPPs. The variable is an employee fixed effect. Stock option grants can occur at any time within the three year pre-crisis or post-crisis windows. To correct for potential differences in the timing of option grants during the two windows (and, therefore, differences in the observed window during which exercise could occur), we include a fixed effect for the event month ( ). So, for example, we include a dummy variable for month one within either threeyear window. We observe exercise choices for 35 months for any such options, regardless of whether the grant occurs pre-or post-crisis. An alternative is to include calendar month fixed effects. The difference is that each post-crisis month would receive a separate fixed effect from its corresponding event month in the pre-crisis window. In this case, we would not be able to identify the coefficient 1 , because the variable After would be a linear combination of the month fixed effects. We find that our estimates of the difference in differences, 3 , are not sensitive to this choice. X is a vector of employee-and firm-level controls, included both as levels (in cases in which the variable has within-employee variation) and as interactions with After. Of particular note, we include nonparametric controls for employee age, income, and wealth and their interactions with After to distinguish the effects of experience from life-cycle differences in investment strategies, income effects, and wealth-dependent risk aversion. We cluster standard errors by firm to correct for correlation in exercise choices across employees who hold options on the same underlying stock.
We use a similar specification to study the differences in employee behavior within ESPPs across experience groups, but with some key differences. Because there are no fixed grant dates within an ESPP, we aggregate employee behavior within the ESPP, separately, within the pre-and post-crisis windows. So, for example, we define a dependent variable that indicates whether the employee participated in the plan at any point during the window. Because there is only one pre-crisis and one post-crisis observation, we do not include employee fixed effects or any form of time fixed effects in our base specification.
Our null hypothesis is that 3 = 0; that is, the change in behavior within option or ESPP plans does not differ depending on investor experience. Though we conduct two-sided tests, our mechanism generates one-sided alternatives. In both stock option plans and ESPPs, passive investor behavior generates corner solutions. A passive investor will fail to exercise stock options and to participate in an ESPP. In the latter case, the passive behavior is strictly dominated by participation because the employee can obtain company stock at a nonzero discount from current market prices (and then sell immediately) by participating. Thus, an employee who receives a shock to his or her attention will increase participation, yielding 3 >0.
In the former case, systematic failure to exercise options is weakly dominated (strictly if the option is in the money at expiration). A strategy of exercising on the expiration date may be optimal if the employee is effectively risk neutral (i.e., is either risk neutral or fully diversified with respect to company risk). However, a risk averse employee who is under-diversified (e.g., because his or her human capital is also invested in the firm) will generally find it optimal to exercise in-the-money options before expiration. In this case, the key tradeoff is between option value and the costs of under-diversification. Overall, this discussion motivates a prediction that, conditional on adjusting behavior after a shock to attention, employees will tend to expedite option exercise. So, again, the relevant alternative hypothesis is 3 >0.
Overweighting of personal return experiences could reinforce the difference in differences in option exercise behavior. That is, a large negative return shock to the employee could cause him or her to over-adjust toward early exercise. Because inexperienced employees have less history of return experience, on average their adjustments will be larger. Note, however, that time-varying risk aversion does not make a direct prediction for 3 since it is unclear how or why it would vary with investor experience. Overweighting of personal return experience does not make a prediction for 3 in the context of ESPPs, however. If anything, recent evidence suggests that this mechanism is likely to cause investors to shy away from participation in equity-based plans altogether (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) . However, it does predict that low experience investors will sell acquired shares within an ESPP sooner than high experience investors, conditional on participation. Overall, the attention and overweighting mechanisms are not mutually exclusive; however, a significant positive estimate for 3 in the context of ESPP participation would confirm that the attention mechanism explains at least part of the observed changes in behavior around the crisis.
Results
In the remainder of the paper, we estimate changes in employee behavior in company stock option plans and ESPPs following the financial crisis of 2008. Our main quantity of interest is the effect of prior investment experience on investor responses to the crisis.
Baseline Estimates of Changes in Employee Exercise and Participation Decisions
To begin, we use Equation (1) In our baseline specification, we include employee fixed effects to control for time invariant differences across individuals that could predict patterns of exercise behavior. 8 We also include event-month fixed effects to control for differences in the timing of the grants and, therefore, in the time available to the employee to exercise the option during the window of observation. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level to control for within-firm correlation in the error terms.
We present the baseline estimates of 1 (the coefficient on After) and 3 (the coefficient on After*Low Exper) in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2 . In Column 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of the option grant exercised during the three-year window in which it was granted (%exer). In Column 4, the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one if the employee ever exercised any of the options in the grant during the three year window in which it was granted (1_ever). Low Exper is an indicator variable that takes the value one for investors who do not receive option grants in our data prior to 2005. In both cases, we estimate positive values of 3 that are statistically significant at the 1% level. Employees with less prior experience have a larger increase in both the quantity of options they exercise and the likelihood of an exercise following the crisis than employees with more experience do. We estimate a 2.5
percentage point difference in the change in the percentage of the option package the employee exercises during the three year window, which is roughly 12% of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. We estimate a 5.5 percentage point relative increase in the likelihood of ever exercising in the three year window, which is equal to 37% of the pre-crisis mean exercise frequency of 15%.
In the remaining columns of the table, we add a variety of additional control variables to the baseline specifications. First, Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) find that prior returns influence employee option exercise decisions. Thus, in Columns 2 and 5
we control for the appreciation in the underlying stock from the time of grant to the end of the window (Share app). We also include the squared value of Share app and an indicator variable equal to one if the option is underwater at the end of the window (Underwater) to allow for a non-linear relationship between stock returns and option exercise. Second, the stock option grants in our sample are likely to be an undiversified holding for most employees. Then, assuming employees are risk averse, the optimal exercise decision trades off option value against the costs of underdiversification. As a rough proxy for underdiversification, we include the natural logarithm of the number of options in the grant and its square as additional controls.
Consistent with prior research, we find that strong performance of the underlying stock predicts increases in option exercise (we estimate a positive and significant coefficient on Share app and a negative and significant coefficient on Underwater). The size of the option grant does not appear to correlate significantly with exercise decisions. Most importantly, adding these controls does not substantially affect our estimates of 3 .
Thus far, we have not considered the vesting schedules of employee option grants. As long as firms have a fixed vesting schedule for their grants (i.e., they use the same vesting schedule for each option package they grant to their employees), it is not necessary to include any additional controls for vesting. In this case, the event month fixed effects fully capture differences across option grants in the amount of time during the observation window that they are exercisable. However, a number of firms did change vesting schedules following the crisis.
To correct for these differences, we allow for a firm fixed effect that differs after the crisis in Columns 3 and 6. These fixed effects also correct for any unobservable changes in firm characteristics following the crisis that correlate with option exercise choices. For example, they capture differences in exercise decisions due to changes in the volatility of the returns on the underlying stock after the crisis. We find that these additional fixed effects do not alter our results. Moreover, the controls subsume any apparent baseline effect of the crisis on high experience investors ( 1 ). Thus, we confirm that investors with less investment experience are more prone to expedite option exercise than investors with more experience following the crisis and appear to be nearly solely responsible for the observed tendency towards earlier exercise in the post-crisis sample.
Next, we turn to our analysis of employee participation and trading decisions in ESPPs.
In our data, we do not observe the full set of employees who have the option to participate in a firm's ESPP plan, but choose not to do so. Within ESPPs, we only observe cases in which an employee participates or sells stock previously acquired in the ESPP. Thus, in each three-year window, we proxy for the set of employees who are eligible to participate in the ESPP using the set of employees at a firm that offers an ESPP who receive a stock option grant during the window. In order to achieve preferential tax treatment, ESPPs must be broadly available to all employees, with some exceptions for new, part-time, and highly compensated employees. Thus, any employee who receives an option grant from a firm with an ESPP plan is almost surely eligible to participate. As a consequence of this sample selection, the sample of employees in our ESPP regressions is a subset of the individuals in Table 2 . 9 A benefit of this structure is that we can compare the consistency of employees' choices across the two types of plans. Moreover, employees' behavior within the ESPP can help us to distinguish between the different mechanisms that could explain the stock option results (time-varying risk aversion, overweighting of personal return experiences, attention).
First, we estimate the change in ESPP participation rates following the crisis for employees with little investment experience compared to the change in participation among employees with more investment experience. We continue to proxy for low investment experience using an indicator that equals one for employees who have not received option grants prior to 2005. We measure ESPP participation rates once per window using an indicator variable that equals one if the employee bought any shares in an ESPP during the window. Because all employees appear exactly two times in the data, we do not include employee fixed effects or event month fixed effects. We continue to cluster robust standard errors at the firm-level to control for any correlation in error terms within a firm.
We present the baseline results with no controls in Column 1 of Table 3 . We find a significant relative increase in ESPP participation rates following the crisis among low experience types. Interestingly, the relative increase in participation in ESPPs essentially offsets significantly lower participation rates among low experience employees prior to the crisis, resulting in convergence between the groups. Given a mean participation rate of 39% in the precrisis window, the 14.8 percentage point increase in participation among low experience investors also appears to be economically large.
Mirroring our approach in Table 2 , we add controls for past returns in Column 2. Here, because there is no well-defined grant date, we measure returns using overlapping time periods ending at the close of each window and starting at minus three months, minus twelve months and minus two years. In Column 3, we also add firm fixed effects and, in Column 4, we include firm fixed effects interacted with After. The former control for time-invariant firm-level characteristics that might correlate with ESPP participation; the latter control for changes in firm-level characteristics, including (unobservable) changes to plan characteristics following the crisis. Perhaps surprisingly, we do not find significant correlations between returns on company stock and ESPP participation. However, in all regression specifications, we continue to observe a relatively greater increase in participation rates by low experience types following the crisis.
These choices are not predicted by theories that rely on increases in risk aversion following negative shocks or overweighting of (negative) personal return experiences, since they increase exposure to the market. However, they are consistent with an increase in investor attention toward their portfolio allocations.
In Columns 5 to 8 of Table 3 , we consider the decision to sell shares acquired in an ESPP. Here, the choice is more analogous to the option exercise choices we analyze in Table 3: selling ESPP shares "locks in" the discount built into the purchase price while simultaneously allowing the employee to diversify his or her portfolio. The dependent variable in our analysis is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee sells some of the ESPP shares acquired during the window within 7 days, 30 days, 90 days or 365 days respectively. For the variable to be defined (and, hence, for the observation to be included in the sample), we require that the investor purchased ESPP shares at least 7 days (or 30 days, 90 days, or 365 days, respectively) prior to the end of the window. The benefit of this approach is that it avoids any right hand side truncation bias if the investor bought the shares near the end of the observation window. The cost of this approach is that the sample sizes differ across the regressions. We modify the specification from Column 3 by estimating it using the dependent variable corresponding to each of the four horizons successively, beginning with 7 days in Column 5.
Over all four horizons, we again find little effect of stock returns during the window on the timing of stock sales. However, we observe that both high and low experience types are 
Wealth, Income, and Age Effects
Our hypothesis predicts a relation between investor experience and changes in investment decisions following the crisis. However, other theories predict relations between individual characteristics such as wealth, income, and age and the same investor choices. For example, if risk aversion is monotonically decreasing and concave in wealth, then low net worth employees will decrease their exposure to risky investments more than high net worth colleagues following an equal-sized shock to wealth. If income and wealth are positively correlated, a similar relation could exist between investment choices and income. Similarly, risk aversion could vary with the life-cycle. Then, older employees could make larger adjustments in response to a common shock if they are more risk averse than younger peers. We adapt equation (1) to test whether crosssectional differences in wealth, income, or age predict different changes in option exercise behavior or ESPP participation rates. Moreover, wealth, income, or age could be correlated with investor experience. Thus, we also test whether variation in these factors could explain the patterns we uncovered in Section 4.1.
In our dataset, we observe self-reported information on wealth, income and age. 10 Net worth is reported in five distinct bins: $25,000-$50,000; $50,000-$100,000; $100,000-$500,000;
$500,000-$1,000,000; and over one million. Similarly, household income is reported in five categories: $15,000-$25,000; $25,000-$50,000; $50,000-$100,000; $100,000-$200,000; and over $200,000. Net worth and income is only observed once in the data per employee, at the time of account opening. In all tests, we measure employee age as of 2005, the start of the pre-crisis window. We include the natural logarithm of age in our regressions because of the skewness in the distribution of age. Table 4 reports the results of adding wealth and income to Equation (1). In Column 1, we report the specification to predict the percent of options exercised from Column 2 of Table 2, but including a full set of indicators for the net worth categories interacted with After. The coefficients on these interactions measure whether employees in different wealth strata change their exercise behavior differentially following the crisis. We cannot identify the level effects of the net worth indicators because they are collinear with the employee fixed effects. Note we do not report the estimates of the effects of the other controls for brevity. We find only one marginally significant effect: employees with net worth greater than one million dollars appear to make larger increases in the percentage of options exercised following the crisis than other employees. However, our estimate of the coefficient of interest, 3 , is again positive and significant. In Column 2, we repeat the approach but include controls for the five categories of household income interacted with After in lieu of the net worth interactions. We again find only a single marginally significant estimate among the income interactions. Here, it is employees with income between $50,000 and $100,000 who make smaller increases in option exercises following the crisis. Most importantly, we again find that low experience types increase their option exercises post-crisis significantly more than more experienced colleagues.
A related possibility is that employees with larger grants make larger adjustments to exercise behavior following the shock. This could occur, for example, if the wealth shock from the fall in stock prices during the crisis is larger among employees with larger grants. Larger grants might also correlate with our measure of investor experience if those employees who have been receiving grants for a longer period of time receive larger grants. To address this possibility, we control for the size of the grant, as measured by the number of options given, and its interaction with After in Column 3. Note that this control also provides a rough, time-varying proxy for wealth or income that is available on the entire sample. We do not find significant differences in the change in exercise behavior among employees with larger and smaller option grants. Moreover, the additional controls again have little effect on our estimates of 3 .
Columns 4 to 6 mirror the specifications in Columns 1-3, but use instead the binary dependent variable, 1_ever. We find similar results. Here, the one significant interaction among the income controls from Columns 1 to 3 is no longer a significant predictor of changes in exercise behavior. But, in all cases, our estimates of 3 are positive and significant.
Finally, we repeat the regression from Column 3 of Table 3 that estimates changes in participation in ESPPs, but including additional controls for wealth and income. In these regressions, we include the level effects of the indicators for the five categories of net worth (Column 7) and the five categories of household income (Column 8) because these regressions do not include employee fixed effects. For brevity, we report only the estimated coefficients on the interaction of these variables with After. We do not find any significant effects of wealth or income on ESPP participation, but we continue to observe that low experience types are relatively more likely to increase their participation in ESPPs following the crisis.
Though differences in wealth and income cannot explain the effect of investor experience on employee's behavior in stock compensation plans, it is possible that there are differential effects of experience within wealth or income subgroups. For example, high wealth low-and high-experience types could be relatively more similar and, as a result, there could be less of a difference in the treatment effect by investor experience within the subset of high net worth individuals. We test whether there is cross-sectional variation in the effect of experience by wealth and income in Tables 5 and 6 . Table 5 divides the sample into three subsets by net worth: less than $100,000; $100,000-$500,000; and greater than $500,000. We then repeat the baseline regressions with controls from Tables 2 and 3 . The dependent variable is the percent of options exercised in Columns 1 to 3, the indicator variable that equals one if the employee exercised any options from the grant in Columns 4 to 6, and the indicator variable that equals one if the employee chose to participate in an ESPP in Columns 7-9. In all nine columns, the coefficient of interest, 3 , remains positive.
Moreover, in eight out of nine of the regressions, the coefficient remains statistically significant.
The exception is the estimate in the high net worth tercile using %exer as the dependent variable (Column 3). However, in this case, the point estimate is nearly identical to the estimate in the middle tercile. Moreover, the effect remains strongly significant even in this tercile when we measure changes in option exercise behavior on the extensive margin. We do not find evidence of strong patterns across the groups. If anything, there appears to be a slightly larger effect of experience among low net worth employees in both sets of option exercise regressions.
Interestingly, the pattern, if anything, appears to be the opposite for ESPP participation. Table 6 reports a similar exercise in which we divide the sample into three subsets by household income: less than $50,000; $50,000-$100,000; and greater than $100,000. As in Table 5 , we repeat the baseline regressions with controls from Tables 2 and 3 using the percent of options exercised as the dependent variable in Columns 1-3, the binary variable capturing whether or not the employee exercised any options in Columns 4-6, and the binary variable capturing the decision to participate in an ESPP in Columns 7-9. In all nine regressions, the estimate of 3 is positive and significant. Here we see evidence of a pattern across groups only on the extensive margin for option exercise. Again, it appears that the effect of experience may be stronger among low income employees.
Finally, we consider potential life-cycle effects on the changes in behavior around the crisis. First, in Table 7 , we interact age (in natural log form) with After to identify whether age impacts how employees differentially respond to the crisis. We find no statistically significant difference in the treatment effect by age when looking at either the intensive or extensive margin of option exercise decisions (Columns 1 and 3). However, we do find that older employees change their participation rates in ESPP plans relatively less following the crisis (column 5). We then include the interaction of low experience and After in Columns 2, 4 and 6 and show that our earlier estimates which find a differential treatment effect by experience are unique to the employee's past history of option grants and do not simply reflect differences in age.
In Table 8 , we repeat the structure of the tests in Tables 5 and 6 and consider three subgroups of the sample defined using employee age. We consider separately employees under age 46, employees between the ages of 46 and 55, and employees older than 55. We find a statistically significant treatment effect of prior experience in all groups, except among the subset of employees over 55 when we consider option exercise decisions. This failure could reflect lower statistical power in the subset of older employees. It could also reflect less sensitivity to current market conditions among employees who are nearer to retirement age. We also see a somewhat weaker effect of experience on changes in ESPP participation as we move from younger to older age groups, though the differences are small.
Differences in Shock Intensity
One potential concern with our earlier results is that the differential effects we observe could be driven by another contemporaneous change in the economy that has different effects on investors depending on their levels of prior investment experience. If our results are indeed driven by the crisis and the resulting drop in stock prices then this suggests a specific test: The magnitude of the differential treatment effect should be larger when the firm's underlying stock price experienced a larger decline.
We measure stock price performance by the decline in the firm's stock price from the beginning of the market crisis (9/15/2009, the date of the collapse of Lehman Brothers) to the date of the post-crisis nadir in market prices, measured by the level of the S&P 500 index (3/9/2009). We then divide the sample at stock price returns of -50%. This allocates roughly one half of the firms into each subset. Table 9 reports results from re-running the baseline tests with controls using as dependent variables the two measures of option exercise behavior and the measure of ESPP participation, separately on the two susbsamples of firms. Consistent with our interpretation of the earlier results, we find that the magnitude of the effect of investor experience is larger when the intensity of the shock (as proxied by the performance of the underlying stock price) was worse. On the intensive margin, the entire effect of experience on changes in option exercise occurs among employees of firms that experienced a stock price decline larger than 50%. The difference in the estimated effect of experience is similarly large on the extensive margin, though we still estimate a positive effect among employees in firms with smaller stock price declines that is statistically significant at the 5% level. When we consider changes in ESPP participation, the effect of experience is roughly double in magnitude among employees of firms that experienced the largest negative returns in the crisis. Overall, the results confirm the decline in prices during the financial crisis as the mechanism generating the treatment effects we estimate in our sample.
Robustness tests
As a final step, we consider several robustness checks of our earlier results. In Table 10 , we report the results of several robustness tests for our analysis of option exercise decisions.
And, in Table 11 we consider an alternative measure of stock option exercise, Forfeit, which is the fraction of the value of an option grant (measured using the Black Scholes formula) that the employee forfeits by exercising options prior to their expiration date. For employees with multiple grants during either the pre-crisis or post-crisis window, we compute the measure as the grant-weighted average.
In our data, we measure employee experience with options using options granted by their current employer. As such, low experience could also reflect a short tenure with the firm.
Employees with different tenures could exhibit differences in future turnover rates. Differences in turnover rates between groups could bias our results if employees exercise all of their vested options immediately prior to departing the firm. To ensure that our results do not reflect departure exercise decisions, we identify a subset of employees in our sample who are still employed at the firm in 2014 (after the end of our post-crisis period.) We then repeat the option exercise tests on this subsample and report the results in Table 10 (Column 1 for %exer and Column 2 for 1_ever). There is less statistical power in the smaller samples; however, we continue to observe that low experience types exhibit a stronger treatment effect following the crisis. That is, low experience investors make larger increases in option exercise compared to high experience colleagues.
In all of our preceding tests, we use a binary measure of investor experience. Low experience types had no option grants in our data prior to 2005. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10, we instead use a continuous variable measuring experience in years from the first observed stock option grant in our sample. Higher values indicate higher levels of experience. We find results similar to those we report with the binary variable. Low experience types change their behavior more following the crisis.
In our analysis of option exercise, we give equal weight to all grants each employee in the sample received in the relevant windows of observation. The average employee receives roughly 2.5 grants. However, there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the number of grants across employees. To ensure that our results are not driven by more numerous but smaller grants,
in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 10 , we limit the sample to the largest grant (as measured by the number of options) that each employee receives in each window. 11 We again find that this alternative approach has little effect on our results.
Finally, employees who receive stock option grants may also receive other forms of equity-based compensation. Then, our measure of high experience could capture employees with larger amounts of outstanding equity awards. For each employee, we estimate the number of restricted stock shares ever granted at the beginning of each window of observation. We then interact this with After to see if differences in the levels of restricted stock grants drive the differential treatment effect. We report the results in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 10 . We do not find significant effects of restricted stock holdings on option exercise behavior. And, our key results remain robust. Moreover, in unreported regressions, we also limit the sample to those employees whose count of total restricted stock grants remains unchanged between the beginning of the pre-and post-crisis windows. For most of the employees in the subsample, total historic restricted stock grants do not change over time because the employee has never received a grant.
Thus, differences in restricted stock cannot be driving the results within this subsample and our results remain robust.
In our final set of tests, we follow the approach of Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) and measure the fraction of the stock option grant value (measured using the Black Scholes formula)
forfeited by the employee when doing an exercise prior to the expiration of the stock option grant. The benefit of this alternative measure is that stock price appreciation since grant and predicted volatility, two variables that are known to impact the exercise decision, are directly incorporated into the dependent variable. We measure differences in behavior across option grants that are already "standardized" to adjust for differences in volatility, moneyness, and remaining duration at the time of exercise. We report the results in Table 11 .
We find estimates consistent with our earlier analysis. We observe that low experience types forfeit relatively more of the value of the option grant following the crisis compared to high experience types. The result holds without further controls (Column 1), with controls for the number of options granted (Column 2), and with controls for the stock price appreciation (Column 3). Moreover, we also replicate the earlier pattern of a stronger treatment effect at those firms where the intensity of the effect of the crisis on the firm's stock price was larger (Columns 4 and 5).
Overall, the pattern of earlier option exercise following the crisis concentrated among employees with limited investment experience appears to be robust to a variety of changes to our estimation methodology.
Conclusion
We find that employees who receive stock option grants from their firms change their exercise decisions following the 2008 financial crisis in a manner consistent with either a decreased willingness to take risk or an increase in investor attention. The effect is concentrated among those investors with the most limited prior experience with option grants.
However, we also observe that the same employees are more likely to participate in an ESPP following the crisis. Again, the result is concentrated among investors with more limited prior experience with stock options. This result cannot be explained simply by changes in individual risk aversion because the employees are increasing their exposure to company stock.
Instead the result appears uniquely consistent with an investor attention story. Following the crisis, employees more closely manage their investments, leading to more value-enhancing decisions, at least in the context of ESPP participation.
Employee stock compensation plans represent a unique challenge for most firms. Human resources departments advocate for these plans as a means to attract, retain and provide incentives to high quality employees. However, the benefits of such plans will be limited if employee-investors make participation and trading decisions in a way that reduces the plan's value, and hence employee satisfaction, through inertia, behavioral biases, or misinformation about best practices. Firms can try to maximize the benefits of such plans by providing employees with education; however, little is known about the optimal approach to and timing of educational outreach programs.
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